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and the Ranarkable Survival of
Non—Market—Clearing Assuinpt ions
ABS TRACT
Non—market—clearing models continue to dominate analysis of
macroeconomic fluctuations and discussions of macroeconomic
policy. This situation is remarkable because non—market—clearing
assumptions seem to be inconsistent with the essential
presumption of neoclassical economic analysis that market
outcomes exhaust opportunities for mutually advantageous
exchange. Non—market—clearing models apparently have survived
because they have evolved to incorporate both the natural—rate
hypothesis and the rational—expectations hypothesis and because
the alternative "equilibrium" approach has failedempirically.
This paper expands on these ideas and briefly discussessome of
the problems that we face in attempting to evaluate empirically
the recent vintage of non—market—clearing models. The main
difficulties seem to involve accounting for shifts in the natural
levels of real aggregates and specifying the timing of thepast





Providence, Rhode Island 02912
(401) 863—2606A primary puzzle that macroeconomic analysis addresses——in
fact, the problem that makes macroeconomics a distinct field of
inquiry——is the empirical relation between nominal and real
aggregate variables. Specifically, a successful theoretical and
empirical analysis of macroeconomic fluctuations must provide
satisfactory explanations for the observed relation between
monetary aggregates and measures of real aggregate economic
activity, as well as for the observed relation between monetary
aggregates and the average price level. Since the Keynesian
revolution in macroeconomics, most models of these relations have
used non—market—clearing assumptions. Non—market—clearing is a
shorthand description of the more precise idea that macroeconomic
fluctuations and the relations between nominal and real aggregate
variables reflect widespread failure of economic agents to
realize expected gains from trade.
In current textbooks, professional journals, and
nontechnical writings, non—market—clearing modelscontinue to
dominate analysis of macroeconomic fluctuations and discussions
of macroeconomic policy. This persistentpopularity of non—
market—clearing assumptions requires explaining because non—
market—clearing models raise basic and widely recognized logical
problems for economic theorists. As critics of non—market—
clearing assumptions periodically point out, widespread failure
to realize expected gains from trade isapparently inconsistent
with essential presumptions that underlie conventional
neoclassical economic analysis of phenomena other than
macroeconomic fluctuations.
In explaining and predicting changes in resource allocation
and income distribution, the distinguishing feature of
neoclassical economic analysis is that it assumes that market
outcomes exhaust opportunities for mutually advantageous
exchange. Neoclassical theory of resource allocation and income
distribution does not presume that continual market clearing is
literally true, but it supposes that deviations from market—2—
clearing are not sufficiently large and persistent to account for
significant economic phenonema. This presumption, of course, is
nothing more than an aspect or natural extension of the basic
neoclassical postulate of maximization. Maximization is so
compelling to economic theorists that it even plays an important
role in filling out models that incorporate non—market—clearing
assumptions.
Over the years, thefl tension between neoclassical analysis
and received macroeconomic models that use non—market—clearing
assumptions has generated a series of innovations that have posed
potent challenges to these models. The natural—rate hypothesis
and the rational—expectations hypothesis probably have been the
most important individual developments in this regard. The most
comprehensive challenge, however, has come from the development.
of an "equilibrium" approach to the study of macroeconomic
fluctuations. Equilibrium models assume that all expected gains
from trade are realized and that expectations are rational, and
they rely on assumptions about incomplete information to generate
a relation between monetary aggregates and real aggregates.
Because equilibrium models avoid non—market—clearing assumptions,
their proponents claim that they are fully consistent with
maximizing behavior.
Non—market—clearing assumptions apparently have survived
this challenge for two main reasons: First, the equilibrium
approach has failed empirically. Specifically, although
contractual formulations of market—clearing assumptions are
consistent with many observed features of macroeconomic
fluctuations, equilibrium models that include consistent and
realistic assumptions about available information seem unable to
explain the facts of the relation between monetary aggregates and
real aggregates. Second, models that use non—market—clearing
assumptions have evolved to incorporate the main innovations in
macroeconomic analysis——specifically, the natural—rate hypothesis
and the rational-expectations hypothesis-—that seem to be
relevant for understanding macroeconomic developments and for—3—
discussing the formulation of macroeconomic policy.
The discussion that follows expands on these ideas and then
looks briefly at the main problems that we face in attempting to
evaluate empirically the recent vintage of non—market—clearing
models. We begin, however, by considering the presumptions that
underlie current mainstream research about macroeconomic
fluctuations.
1. !4onetary Nonneutrality and the Natural—Rate Hypothesis
Most current mainstream research in macroeconomics is based
on two apparently plausible beliefs about the structure and
history of market economics: First, because the economic
structure is nori—Walrasian, monetary disturbances are not
neutral. Specifically, through non—Walrasian causal linkages,
changes in the behavior of monetary aggregates produce both
temporary changes in real aggregates and temporary deviations
from the behavior of wages and prices implied by Wairasian
assumptions. Second, the temporary non—Walrasian effects of
monetary disturbances on real aggregates and the price level have
been quantitatively significant. Specifically, the observed
historical relations among these variables reflect these non—
Walrasian linkages to an extent and in a way that enables us to
isolate and to study them by analyzing data.
These presumptions imply both that monetary policy can
affect real aggregates as well as the price level and that
empirical analysis using appropriate econometric techniques
offers the possibility of being able to quantify and to predict
these policy effects. In actual modelling, a non—Walrasian
structure has meant that exchange takes place either under non—
market-clearing conditions or with agents in possession of
incomplete information about potential gains from trade. The
mainstream research program does not rule out the existence of
additional interactions between monetary aggregate and real
aggregates, some of which can be consistent with Walrasian
assumptions. Moreover, it presumes that the long—run relabions—4—
between monetary aggregates, realaggregates, and the price level
are Walrasian. The natural—rate hypothesis embodiesthis long—
run convergence to a Walrasian outcome. Themainstream research
horizon presumes, however, that the historicaldata contain
recognizable intervals over which, either because ofthe failure
of markets to clear or because of incompleteinformation,
monetary disturbances have been the dominant factoraffecting
real aggregates.
Briefly consider the main alternatives to this
presumption. In general, money is not superneutral ina
Walrasian context. Specifically, even undergeneral market—
clearing and with complete information, values of realvariables
can depend on the rates of change of monetaryaggregates.
Failure of superneutrality has received considerabletheoretical
attention. See Fischer (1980) for a useful overview.There
seems, however, to be no good theoretical or empirical reason to
believe that lack of superneutrality is relevantto the cyclical
behavior of real aggregates and the price level.
Another possible way to explain relations betweenmonetary
and real variables would be through causationrunning either from
real aggregates or from factors responsible forfluctuations in
real aggregates to monetary aggregates.Specifically, it is
possible to formulate macroeconomic models that have the
following three implications: First, fluctuations in real
aggregates result either from disturbances to real factors——
tastes, technology, or resources——or from disturbances to
monetary velocity. Second, a relation between monetary
aggregates and real aggregates that has realistic characteristics
reflects so—called reverse causation. Third,monetary dis-
turbances, possibly induced by other disturbances, affect only
the price level. See, for example, King and Plosser(1982).
Such "real" business—cycle models, however, seem unlikely to
account for the facts for at least two reasons: First,nobody
has identified a set of impulses that does not contain
disturbances to monetary aggregates and that has appropriate—5—
structural characteristics, sufficient magnitude, -andrequisite
regularity to be responsible for the bulk of observed
fluctuations in real aggregates. Second, specific historical
episodes seem to exist in which policymakers haveattempted
deliberately to use monetary policy either to stimulate real
economic activity or to reduce inflation, and in which real
aggregates have responded directly to these policy initiativesas
mainstream macroeconomics supposes.
2.Market Clearing: Spot and Contractual
As mentioned above, models used to implement the research
program of mainstream macroeconomic analysis either employ non—
market—clearing assumptions or combine incomplete—information
assumptions with the assumption that all expected gains from
trade are realized. Most incomplete—information models formalize
the idea that all expected gains from trade are realizedby
specifying that prices and quantities equate spot demands and
supplies. As critics have frequently pointed out, this
specification of market clearing seems inconsistent with
prominent observed features of macroeconomic fluctuations——
especially, lack of correlation between aggregate employment and
real wage rates and apparent symptoms of the failure of labor
markets to clear, such as the use of layoffs to effectemployment
separations and the positive correlation between quit rates and
aggregate employment. -
Anotherproblem with standard incomplete—information models
is that a framework of cleared spot markets requiresstrong
restrictions on utility functions in order to produce realistic
correlations among monetary aggregates and various real
aggregates. For example, for aggregate production to respond
positively to monetary disturbances, the representative supplier
of factors of production must respond positively when it
believes, perhaps incorrectly, that the relative value of its
current marginal product has changed. One difficulty with this
specification is that a change in the value of current marginal—6—
product relative to consumption prices and/or future marginal
products involves both substitution effects and income effects,
and the correct positive response occurs only if substitution
effects are dominant. Another difficulty is that assuming strong
intertemporal substitution effects can preclude a positive
correlation between aggregate production and aggregate
consumption. See Seater (1977, 1978) and Barro and King (1982)
for further analysis of these modelling problems.
More imaginative versions of incomplete—information models——
see, for example, Azariadis (l978)——extend the concept of market
clearing to cover efficient contractual setting of quantities and
certain prices in an explicitly stochastic setting. In models of
efficient contracts, employment and the remuneration of
productive factors satisfy both perceived productive—efficiency
conditions, which imply realization of expected gains, from trade,
and risk—sharing—efficiency conditions.
A key implication of risk—sharing efficiency is that
equality between the remuneration received by a factor of
production and its marginal product obtains in some average
sense, but does not necessarily hold at all points in time. This
theoretical implication means that it is not appropriate to use
observed time series of factor remunerations to measure
variations in marginal products. For example, failure of an
incomplete—information model to fit data on real wages under the
maintained assumption of equality between observed factor
remunerations and marginal products can mean merely that the
efficient—contracts version of incomplete—information modelling
is more realistic than the spot—market version.
Formalizations of the concept of market clearing within a
framework of efficient contracts also suggest ways to get around
various empirical objections to the assumption that expected
gains from trade are realized. For example, contractual models
explain layoffs as a consequence of the fact that wages do not
signal changes in value of marginal product. Given efficient
risk—shifting arrangements, layoffs do not imply a failure to—7—
realize expected gains from trade. Also, in these models,
perverse income effects are less of a problem becausevariations
in worker income are mitigated and are not directly related to
variations in value of marginal product. See Grossman (1979,
1981) for an extensive discussion of these issues.
The assumption of efficient contracts, of course, is
radically different from stories about nominal labor contracts
that sometimes are used in non—market—clearing models. Some
proponents of non—market—clearing assumptions have argued, by
reference to observed collective bargaining agreements, that, at
least in the labor market, efficient contracting is not
realistic. They point out, for example, that actual labor
contracts lack explicit provisions for indexing wages completely
to observed nominal disturbances and allow employers todetermine
the employment status of workers.
The literature on efficient contracts, however, has
recognized that key arrangements that make contractsefficient
are likely to be implicit. If we accept the implicit-contracts
story, neither the absence of explicit indexation orthe
practices of layoff and recall preclude the attainmentof
productive efficiency and risk—sharing efficiency.
The main point of this section is that the usual objections
raised to doing macroeconomic analysis within a market—clearing
framework do not seem compelling. Models that embody incomplete
information within a context of efficient contracts suggest that
many observed features of macroeconomicfluctuations are
consistent with realization of all expected gains from trade.
Thus, the survival of non—market—clearing assumptionsis not
attributable to direct evidence that market clearing is
unrealistic.
3.Rational Expectations and Equilibrium Models
In addition to the distinction between market—clearingand
non—market—clearing assumptions, models used to implementthe
research program of mainstream macroeconomic analysis arealso—8—
distinguishable according to whether or not they assume that
expectations are rational. In this context, rational
expectations means the hypothesis that private agents believe as
if they understand the economy's relevant stochastic relations,
including the process governing monetary policy. This hypothesis
gives operational content to the maximization postulate that
private agents gather and use information efficiently.
On a priori grounds, it would seem most natural and
congenial for neoclassical economists to assume both that trans-
actions realize all expected gains from trade (MC) and that
agents form rational expectations (RE). Such MC-RE models are
often called "equilibrium" models, a name that connotes the
logical security that is part of neoclassical economics.
The basic obstacle to evaluating the reality, either in an
absolute or relative sense, of the four possible combinations of
assumptions about market clearing and rational expectations is
that they can exhibit essential isomorphisms. Most importantly,
all four combinations are consistent both with nonneutrality of
monetary disturbances and with the natural—rate hypothesis, which
limits non—Walrasian effects to the short run. Empirical
evaluation, consequently, must rely on other, more subtle,
aspects of the relation between monetary aggregates, real
aggregates, and the price level.
A particular problem in interpreting empirical results is to
distinguish between the implications of MC—RE models and the
implications of models that assume rational expectations, but
incorporate non—market—clearing (NMC) assumptions. Econometric
analysis relating to the macroeconomic relevance of rational
expectations often has blurred this distinction. As explained
below, the most widely discussed proposition associated with the
introduction of rational expectations into macroeconomic models——
namely, the proposition that the observed relation between real
aggregates and the money stock reflects unanticipated money
policy——is a direct implication of NMC—RE models, rather than
MC—RE models.—9—
A more restrictive proposition about monetary inferences
that follows peculiarly from MC—RE models and provides a basis
for an econometric test of the reality of MC—RE modelling is
the following: For a disturbance to the money stock to affect
the short—run behavior of real aggregates, this disturbance has
to be both imperfectly anticipated and imperfectly perceived. To
define terms more precisely, in this context, anticipation refers
to inferences about current events based on observations about
past events, and perception refers to inferences about current
events based on observations about other current events.
The important paper by King (1981) makes clear how given the
market—clearing assumption, the inferences of an agent operating
according to the rational—expectations hypothesis are based on
observations about both past events and current events. In other
words, the relevant rational expectation in MC—RE models is an
optimal combination of anticipation and perception. Thus,
anOther way to state the above proposition is that disturbances
to monetary aggregates affect real aggregates only to the extent
that observations about past events and current events taken
together do not permit agents to infer current monetary
aggregates accurately.
In the limit, if the value of current monetary aggregates
were part of the information set of private agents——as, for
example, in Brunner, Cukierman, and Meltzer (1980) or Grossman
and Weiss (1982)——rnonetary disturbances would have no effect on
real aggregates. Under this assumption, all fluctuations in real
aggregates reflect disturbances to real factors and/or to
monetary velocity. In general, correct theoretical development
of MC—RE modelling as well as correct empirical implementation
along the usual lines involving estimation of an implied reduced
form would have to relate real aggregates to measures of both
unanticipated and unperceived monetary disturbances.
A potentially testable implication of the analysis of
monetary inferences, also derived in King (1981), is the
following: Any currently available observation or combination of— 10—
currentlyavailable observations that provides unbiased
information about current monetary aggregates——more generally,
the known part of any disturbance that would be neutral under
complete information——cannot cause short—run movements in real
aggregates. This implication has practical importance for
empirical analysis of MC—RE modelling because preliminary U.S.
monetary data that is contemporaneously available, although
subject to subsequent cQrrection and revision, provides such an
unbiased observation of current monetary aggregates.
Recognition of contemporaneous monetary data leads to
additional important implications for empirical analysis and for
the relation between theory and policy evaluation.In an
MC—RE context, if, in addition to being random, the deviation
between contemporaneous preliminary monetary data and finally
reported monetary data is small——that is, if currently available
monetary data actually provides a highly accurate perception of
current monetary aggregates——monetary disturbances, even if
unanticipated, have little or no effect on the short—run behavior
of real aggregates.In this case, finding a significant
empirical relation between unanticipated monetary disturbances
and real aggregates would be, if anything, evidence against the
reality of MC—RE modelling. As explained below, such evidence,
in contrast, would be supportive of NMC—RE modelling.
In addition, if MC—RE modelling were realistic, the
availability of accurate contemporaneous monetary data would make
the effects of monetary policy independent of its predict-
ability. In this case, a contemporaneous observed reduction in
the growth rate of monetary aggregates would produce an immediate
and permanent decrease in the inflation rate, without the
frequently emphasized cost of a temporary decrease in real
aggregates. Thus, discussions of monetary policy that focus on
the credibility of announced policy intentions presume, at least
implicitly, either that contemporaneous monetary data is not
accurate or that NIC—RE modelling is not realistic. In
contrast, even with accurate contemporaneous monetary data,— 11—
emphasison credibility is natural and highly relevant within
an NMC—RE context.
The classic MC—RE models——tot example, Lucas (1972, 1973)
and Barro (1976)——obscured these issues because they ignored the
existence of contemporaneously available monetary data.As a
modelling strategy, this abstraction seems to be an especially
bad choice. Contemporaneous preliminary monetary data are
readily available, are an unbiased measure, and are highly
correlated with finally reported monetary data. Abstracting from
contemporaneous monetary data, thus, seems contrary to the
postulates and modelling strategy underlying the idea of rational
expectations. Rational, maximizing agents do not ignore readily
available and relevant information.In addition, this
abstraction seems inconsistent with evidence from financial
markets that contemporaneous monetary data have significant
effects on asset prices. See, for example, Urich (1982).
In order to implement direct tests of MC—RE models based
on the neutrality of monetary information, Boschen and Grossman
(1982) extend King's model in two ways: First, we take account
both of the availability of preliminary data Qn current monetary
aggregates and of the process of accumulation of revised monetary
data. Because of positive correlation in the revisions of
estimates of current and past monetary aggregates, inferences
about current monetary policy and, hence, current real
aggregates, depend on information about past monetary policy and
on past random disturbances to monetary aggregates. Second, we
allow monetary policy to respond systematically to past levels of
real aggregates, and we allow present levels of real aggregates
to depend on past levels of real aggregates through the
production technology. These extensions enable us to control for
the possibility of spurious correlation between current real
aggregates and contemporaneous monetary data that could arise
because both are related to past real aggregates.
In this extended MC—RE framework, the main testable
hypothesis is that the current innovation in real aggregates is— 12—
uncorrelatedwith contemporaneous measures of current and past
changes in monetary aggregates. Analysis of data for the United
States from 1953 through 1978, not surprisingly, implies
unambiguous rejection of this hypothesis. Given the presumption
that causation actually runs from monetary disturbances to
fluctuations in real aggregates, an appropriate inference from
this empirical result is that the combined assumptions of market
clearing and rational expectations do not fit the facts.
Although market clearing and rational expectations are
individually attractive assumptions, in combination with a
realistic specification of the information structure, they seem
unable to account for the observed relation between monetary
aggregates and real aggregates.
A second hypothesis implied by the extended MO—RE frame-
work is that the innovation in real aggregates is positively
correlated with revisions in preliminary measures of changes in
monetary aggregates, these revisions being measures of the
unperceived part of monetary policy. The empirical analysis in
our paper, which is consistent with earlier work of Barro and
Hercowitz (1980), fails to reject the contrary of this second
hypothesis. This finding both reinforces the conclusion that
MO—RE modelling is unrealistic and indicates that failure to
perceive current monetary policy accurately is not a significant
source of monetary nonneutrality.
Rejection of models that combine the assumptions of market
clearing and rational expectations suggests that either one or
both of these assumptions are not satisfactory as—if
representations of the true structure of the economy. One
possibility is that the rational—expectations hypothesis is
false, but that the hypothesis that incomplete information within
a market—clearing context is responsible for the relation between
monetary aggregates and real aggregates is true. Such models
involving market clearing and nonrational expectations (MC—NRE)
were theoretical forerunners of equilibrium models. Prominent
examples include Friedman (1968), Lucas and Rapping (1970), and—. 13—
Mortensen(1970).
Recent research, however, has focused our NMC—RE models
rather than on MC-NRE models. There seem to be at least two
good reasons for the neglect of MC—NRE models. First, now that
we understand the idea of rational expectations, an assumption
that expectations are not rational seems incongruous in a model
that assumes that expected gains from trade are realized.
Second, no specific hypothesis about expectations, other than
rational expectations, seems sufficiently compelling to warrant
the effort and resources required for econometric
implementation. Tests o rational expectations are much more
interesting than tests of ad hoc expectations mechanisms.
4. Rational Expectations Without Market Clearing
The preceding discussion implies that the continued
popularity of non—market—clearing assumptions is a consequence of
the combination of the empirical failure of equilibrium models
and, somewhat ironically, the popularization of the idea of
rational expectations. The survival of non—market—clearing
assumptions, however, also has involved the incorporation of the
natural—rate hypothesis and the rational—expectations hypothesis
into non-market—clearing modelling. These two positive develop-
ments have produced NMC—RE models that are an attractive
alternative to both MC—RE and MC—NRE models.
Those neoclassical, economists who attempt to. rationalize
non—market—clearing assumptions naturally reason as follows: The
objective of agents who set (say) wages is to satisfy market—
clearing conditions——that is, to set wages such that all expected
gains from trade are realized. However, technical or other
factors, which are not well understood, prevent perpetual
achievement of this goal. This reasoning leads directly to the
wage—setting hypothesis that wages adjust over time to close the
gap between current wages and the future pathof wages that
agents anticipate would be consistent with market clearing.
This wage—setting hypothesis implies that the actual rate of—14 —
wageinflation is larger (smaller) than the anticipatedgrowth
rate of market—clearing wages if and only if actualwages are
below (above) their current market—clearing level.Moreover, the
larger is the current gap between market—clearingwages and
actual wages and/or the higher is the anticipatedgrowth rate of
market—clearing wages, the higher is the current inflation
rate. For further development of this analysis,see, for
example, Barro and Grossman (1976, ch. 5) and Mussa (1981). This
hypothesis. also implies that past anticipations otpresent
market—clearing wages predetermine, or help to predetermine,
actual present wages. Fischer (1977) and Phelps andTaylor
(1977) stress this latter phenomenon.
Derivation of the natural—rate hypothesis ina non—market—
clearing context requires combining this specification ofwage
adjustment with a suitable specification of the determination of
real aggregates. To be concrete, suppose, as inKeynes (1936)
and in some recent models of nominalwage contracting, such as
Fischer (1977) ,thatnon—market—clearing conditions occur only in
labor markets. Specifically, nominalwages are wholly or partly
predetermined and can be inconsistent with the clearing of labor
markets, but prices always adjust to clear product markets.
Moreover, employment is positively related to demands for labor
services, which, inturn,are negatively related to real wage
rates.
These assumptions imply that actual realaggregates are
larger (smaller) than their natural levels——that is, the levels
that would obtain under market—clearing conditions——if andonly
if wages are below (above) their currentmarket-clearing
levels. Combining these relations between inflation and current
wages and between real aggregates and current wages yields the
following formulation of the natural—rate hypothesis: Actual
levels of real aggregates are larger (smaller) than their natural
levels if and only if the actual inflation rate is larger
(smaller) than what private agents anticipate that the inflation
rate would be under market—clearing conditions.—15—
This analysis readily extends to a situation in which
product prices are also wholly or partly predetermined and can be
inconsistent with clearing of product markets. In this case of
general disequilibrium, the distinction between wages and prices
is not crucial. For further analysis of this case, see, for
example, Barro and Grossman (1976, ch. 2).
In any event, in a complete model that relates aggregate
demand and market—clearing wages and prices to monetary
aggregates, given predetermined wages and/or prices, larger
monetary aggregates generate both a larger difference between
actual real aggregates and their natural levels and a larger
difference between the actual inflation rate and what private
agents anticipate the inflation rate would be under market—
clearing conditions. Moreover, whether or not non—market—
clearing conditions are limited to labor markets, the theoretical
relations determining real aggregates and wage and price levels,
taken together, imply that, if past anticipations of the present
market—clearing wage and price levels were accurate, then present
real aggregates would equal their natural levels, and the present
inflation rate would equal the inflation rate that private agents
anticipate would he consistent with future market clearing.
The second major development in non—market—clearing
modelling, attributable to Fischer (1977) and Phelps and Taylor
(1977) ,isthe additional incorporation of the rational—
expectations hypothesis. This extension means that anticipations
of the market—clearing wage and price levels, which serve to
predetermine actual wages and/or prices, reflect anticipations of
monetary aggregates and, specifically, are based on understanding
of the true relation between monetary aggregates and the market—
clearing wage and price levels, Consequently, for a monetary
disturbance to cause the actual market—clearing wage and price
levels to differ from the anticipated market—clearing wage and
price levels, and, thus, to affect the short—run behavior of real
aggregates, this disturbance has to be imperfectly anticipated.
The rational—expectations hypothesis also means that— 16—
anticipationsof monetary aggregates are based on the true
process governing monetary policy. Thus, in NMC—RE models,
present disturbances to monetary aggregates are unanticipated or
imperfectly anticipated only to the extent that rational agents
cannot predict such disturbances accurately using all information
available when they form these anticipations. Note also that
NMC—RE models accommodate the Lucas (1976) critique of
econometric policy evaluation.
The critical difference between the corresponding
implications of NMC—RE and MC—RE models involves the
relevance of perceptions. In NMC-RE models, with the actual
wage level or wage and price levels predetermined by past
anticipations and real aggregates dependent on the accuracy of
these anticipations, perceptions——that is,. inferences about
current monetary disturbances based on observations about current
events——are not consequential. Specifically, contemporaneously
available data on monetary aggregates do not make monetary
disturbances neutral in NMC—RE models because, by assumption,
the process determining real aggregates cannot respond to such
information. Thus, the finding, discussed above, that real
aggregates are significantly related to contemporaneous monetary
data is not evidence against the reality of NMC—RE modelling.
Moreover, the additional finding that real aggregates are not
significantly related to measures of unperceived monetary
disturbances is supportive of NMC—RE modelling.
Itn important attraction of NNIC-RE models is that they have
provided an interesting and apparently relevant framework for
policy analysis. The natural—rate hypothesis and the rational—
expectations hypothesis imply important limitations on the
effects of monetary policy, but: within a non—market—clearing
context, they do not imply that monetary policy is irrelevant for
the short—run behavior of real aggregates. Specifically, in the
NMC—RE models just described, if monetary policy responds to
information that became available after private agents have pre—
determined present nominal wages——for example, observations about— 17—
morerecent events——then, rational expectations notwithstanding,
the feedback rule governing monetary policy can influence the
extent to which the present behavior of the nominal money stock
is unanticipated and, hence, can influence the stochastic
properties of real aggregates. Thus, in these NMC—RE models,
policy analysis focuses on differences in information sets and,
in particular, on differences in the timing that are involved in
the wage—price setting decisions of private agents and in the
responses of monetary policy.
The NMC—RE models that we have been discussing violate the
neoclassical presumption that all expected gains from trade are
realized. Nevertheless, they have a neoclassical motivation in
that they assume that the objective of wage and price setting
agents is to satisfy market—clearing conditions. These models,
therefore, seem to be at least potentially reconcilable with
neoclassical economic analysis through the possible development
within a maximization framework of a convincing model of the
factors responsible for failure to achieve market clearing. In
this sense, from a neoclassical perspective, these models are
relatively clean.
In contrast to these clean tiMe—RE models, Taylor (1979,
1980) has developed much dirtier NMC-RE models that incorporate
explicit backward—looking elements into the wage—setting
process. Taylor rationalizes this formulation by presumingthat
wage—setting agents have relative wages as an explicit
objective. In fact, although expectations about future wages and
prices also enter into Taylor's wage—setting processes, this role
for expectations also derives from relative wage consciousness,
and not from a goal of realizing expected gains from trade.
Taylor shows that his models can generate realistic looking
patterns of persistence in the behavior of wages andreal
aggregates, but his suggestion that clean NMC—REmodels cannot
fit these facts as well seems unwarranted. See, for example,
Gertler (1981, 1982). Thus, Taylor's models, although they
incorporate the natural—rate hypothesis and rational— 18—
expectations,seem hopelessly ad hoc from a neoclassical
perspective, and also have no obvious empirical advantage.
5.Empirical Analysis of NMC—RE Models
The main conceptual problem involved in empirically
implementing NMC—RE models concerns the dating of the formation
of the expectations that are relevant to the determination of
current real aggregates. One theoretical possibility is that the
true interval involved in the pre—determination of nominal wages
is sufficiently short that NMC—RE models are not empirically
distinguishable from MC—RE models. The empirical failure of
MC—RE. modelling, however, suggests that we cannot dismiss non—
market—clearing assumptions so easily.
A more serious practical problem is that, at least in the
American context, the fact that explicit labor contracts are not
synchronized suggests that the predetermination of present
nominal wages involves a set of overlapping time intervals.
Specifically, if the NMC—RE story that nominal wages are
predetermined is true, it seems likely that anticipations formed
at a number of past dates, and, hence, based on different
information sets, are responsible for determining the present
nominal wage level. Parkin (1980) and Fethke and Policano (1982.)
have analyzed the staggering of contracts theoretically, but,
unfortunately, such questions of timing are difficult to resolve
econometrically. For example, Fisher (1980, p. 220) concludes
"that the data cannot tell us whether only one—year ahead or only
two—year ahead errors in predicting money, or both, contribute to
explaining the behavior of output."
As noted above, much of the empirical work relating to the
macroeconomic relevance of rational expectations has focused on
the relation between real aggregates and unanticipated monetary
disturbances and, thus, would seem to represent implementation
of NMC—RE modelling. The seminal contribution along these
lines is the work of Barro, which is summarized and updated in
Barro (1981, ch. 5). Barro's work and various related studies,— 19—
however,do not address the issue of the dating of relevant
expectations. Consequently, their findings are not unambiguously
interpretable as estimates of the reduced—form relations implied
by NMC—RE models. Nevertheless, this research is instructive
about the problems involved in drawing inferences from the data
about the true relation between monetary aggregates and real
aggregates.
Most of Barro's work focuses on the effects of disturbances
to the average value of monetary aggregates during a calendar
year that rational agents could not have anticipated using
information available at the beginning of the year. His results
in the main seem consistent with the hypothesis that such
disturbances, and only such disturbances, affect the value of
real aggregates in the current and succeeding calendar years.
Strictly speaking, this conclusion accords with an NMC—RE model
that includes two auxiliary assumptions. First, nominal wages
are predetermined at the beginning of each calendar year.
Second, technological factors produce the observed pattern of
persistence in the effects on real aggregates.
Other studies have produced similar results using quarterly
data——see, for example, Barro and Rush (1980) for the U.S. and
Attfield, Demery, and Duck (1981) for the U.K.——and, accordingly,
are directly supportive of the assumption that nominal wages are
predetermined at the beginning of each quarter.In all of these
studies, however, inconsistency, most apparent in the lag
patterns, between estimated equations for real aggregates and
estimated equations for the price level is a serious problem.
Other problems involve apparent sensitivity of the empirical
results to changes in supplementary assumptions. For example,
Pesaran (1982) finds that Barro's conclusions depend on the
assumption that private agents are able to predict real federal
expenditures. Pesaran also finds that different testing
procedures suggest different conclusions.
Mishkin (1983, ch. 6) expands Barro's analysis by
distinguishing the hypothesis that only unanticipated monetary— 20—
disturbancesaffect real aggregates from the hypothesis that the
relevant anticipations are rational expectations, and he attempts
to test these hypotheses both jointly and separately. Mishkin is
able to replicate the results of Barro and Rush, but he finds
that, without their truncation of the lagged effects of
unanticipated monetary disturbances, the data strongly reject the
irrelevance of anticipated monetary disturbances and give an
ambiguous verdict on rational expectations.
The problems and ambiquities involving dynamic aspects in
this line of research possibly result from inadequate
specification of the dating of relevant expectations. Another
possibility is that these problems reflect inadequate modelling
of the natural levels of real aggregates. Barro's formulation of
the process generating the natural levels is admittedly
simplistic, and Mishkin assumes that the natural levels merely
follow time trends. It may be, however, that the extended lagged
effects of monetary variables that play an important role in
Mishkin's study are serving as a proxy for a significant
disturbance to the natural levels of real aggregates. This
suggestion is plausible because it seems clear that recent
American data cannot satisfy the restrictions implied by the
natural—rate hypotheses without allowing for such a disturbance.
The behavior of the unemployment rate illustrates this point
dramatically. An assumption that the natural unemployment rate
was constant over the postwar period would imply that the actual
unemployment rate was below the natural rate until about 1970 and
above the natural rate since then. Given the actual behavior of
the price level and any plausible specification of inflationary
expectations, this implication is clearly inconsistent with the
natural—rate hypothesis. Moreover, assuming that the natural
unemployment rate increased steadily over the postwar period, or
even just for Mishkin's 1954 to 1976 sample, does not do much to
alleviate thus inconsistency. What seems to be necessary to
reconcile the data with the natural—rate hypothesis is to model
the natural unemployment rate such that it increases sharply— 21—
between1970 and 1974, hut otherwise exhibits no noticeable
trend.
A model of the natural unemployment rate that could generate
this behavior might emphasize the effects of military manpower
policy and/or of expanded income maintenance programs. In any
event, it is clear that understanding the behavior of the natural
unemployment rate persents an essential problem in reconciling
the data with the natural—rate hypothesis. Moreover, the
apparent empirical importance of correct modelling of the natural
levels of real aggregates also suggests why as Mishkin finds, the
data do not seem able to provide clear evidence on.the reality of
the rational—expectations hypothesis.
The general point is that convincing econometric
implementation of NMC—RE models requires, among other things,
identifiable specifications of the distinct processes that
generate monetary policy and the natural levels of real
aggregates. Given the actual response of monetary policy to the
behavior of real aggregates and the available data, such
specifications may not be empirically feasible.
6.Concluding Comment
The reaction of economic theorists to the survival of non—
market—clearing assumptions often is to swallow hard and to look
the other way. This response is hardly adequate. The position
that strict application of neoclassical maximization postulates
is relevant to macroeconomic developments only in the "long run"
may seem reasonable from an empirical standpoint, but it puts
neoclassical economics in a defensive position. It suggests the
possibility of a general inability of neoclassical economics to
account for short-run economic phenomena.— 22—
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